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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Jurisdiction rests with this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann., 78-2a3(2)(j).

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue 1:

The trial court erred in failing to apply the doctrine of

substantial partial performance and in only applying the statute of frauds
analysis.
Standard of Review: De novo. “Questions of statutory interpretation
are . . . questions of law that are reviewed ‘for correctness’ giving no
deference to the [trial] court’s interpretation.” Centennial Inv. Co., LLC, v.
Nuttall, 171 P.2d 458 (Utah Ct. App. 2007) (citations omitted). A review of
summary proceedings under Utah Code Ann., § 38-9-7 calls for statutory
interpretation and presents a question of law; there is no deference given to
the trial court’s legal conclusion.

Russell v. Thomas, 999 P.2d 1244, 1246

(Utah Ct. App. 2000).

Preservation for Appeal: Record at pages 50-54.

Issue 2: The trial court erred in failing to deem the statute of frauds
was satisfied where grantor admits that agent has authority to act on his behalf
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and agent signs document conveying interest in real property.
Standard of Review: De novo. “Questions of statutory interpretation
are . . . questions of law that are reviewed ‘for correctness’ giving no
deference to the [trial] court’s interpretation.”

Centennial Investment

Company, LLC, v. Nuttall, 2007 UT App. 321, 171 P.2d 458 (Utah Ct. App.
2007) (citations omitted).

A review of summary proceedings under Utah

Code Ann., § 38-9-7 calls for statutory interpretation and presents a question
of law; there is no deference given to the trial court’s legal conclusion.
Russell v. Thomas, 999 P.2d 1244, 1246 (Utah Ct. App. 2000).

Preservation for Appeal: Record at pages 50-54.

Issue 3: The District Court erred in dismissing Frank Fu’s counterclaim and cross-claim at the conclusion of the of the wrongful lien hearing,
i.e. does a counter-claim survive the final order where the initial lawsuit is for
a wrongful lien?
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Standard of Review: De novo. “Questions of statutory interpretation
are . . . questions of law that are reviewed ‘for correctness’ giving no
deference to the [trial] court’s interpretation.”

Centennial Investment

Company, LLC, v. Nuttall, 2007 UT App. 321, 171 P.2d 458 (Utah Ct. App.
2007). A review of summary proceedings under Utah Code Ann., § 38-9-7
calls for statutory interpretation and presents a question of law; there is no
deference given to the trial court’s legal conclusion.

Russell v. Thomas, 999

P.2d 1244, 1246 (Utah Ct. App. 2000).

Preservation for Appeal: Frank Fu argued that the counter-claims and
cross-claims should not be dismissed.
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CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS OR RULES

Constitution Provisions: The due process clause at Art. I, § 7 of the
Utah Constitution which states “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”

Statutory Provisions:
1) Utah Code Ann., § 38-9-1, et seq. Wrongful Liens and Wrongful
Judgment Liens. See Addendum “A” at the end of brief.
2) Utah Code Ann., § 57-9-1. See Addendum “B” at the end of brief.
3) Utah Code Ann., § 25-5-1. See Addendum “C” at the end of brief.

Rules:
Rule 13(b) of the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure: “A pleading may state
as a counterclaim any claim against an opposing party not arising out of
the transaction of occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing
party’s claim.”
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case & Procedural History
The issue in this case is whether Frank Fu’s notice of interest on Tolin
is proper or wrongful. Joseph Naso and Rene (Naso) Evans filed a complaint
against Frank Fu on April 1, 2008, alleging that his notice of interest filed on
two pieces of real property, Brandonwood and Tolin, constituted a wrongful
lien. Frank Fu filed counter-claims and third-party claims alleging breach of
contract, foreclosure, fraudulent transfer, common law fraud and negligent
misrepresentation. These claims were filed because Frank Fu believes that
Clyde Rhodes and Joseph Naso, among others, conspired together to cheat
him out of the $105,000.00 he paid for an interest in real property in this case,
plus other money he loaned totaling about $50,000.00.
Judge Deno Himonas started an expedited hearing on Joseph Naso and
Rene (Naso) Evans’ wrongful lien claim, pursuant to Utah Code Ann., § 39-97, late in the afternoon on June 15th and finished it on the 16th.
At the conclusion of the hearing Judge Himonas ruled that Frank Fu’s
notice of interest on Brandonwood was proper but as to Tolin it was wrongful.
Judge Himonas reasoned that while Rene (Naso) Evans had signed a warranty
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deed conveying her interest in Tolin, Joseph Naso had not signed the warranty
deed or any document conveying his interest and thus the applicable statute of
frauds was not satisfied. Judge Himonas ruled as he did even though Frank
Fu paid $105,000.000 which was supposed to include an interest in both
Brandonwood and Tolin.
The Order finding the wrongful lien was signed by Judge Deno
Himonas on May 12, 2008.

Judge Himonas also dismissed Frank Fu’s

counter-claims and third-party claim. Frank Fu appeals those decisions.

Statement of Facts
The facts relevant to the issues on appeal are as follows: Joseph and
Rene Evans (Naso) knew that an interest in two pieces of property,
Brandonwood and Tolin, were being offered by Clyde Rhodes to Frank Fu.
(See R. at page 51-52.) There is no issue as to whether Rene Naso transferred
her interest to Frank Fu through her agent Clyde Rhodes, see R. at p. 59:25,
and 60:1-14, the only issue is whether Joseph Naso did because he did not
sign the warranty deed.
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Joseph Naso testified under oath that he “knew [Clyde Rhodes] was
acting for us,” see R. at pp. 55:25 and 56:1-4, i.e. on behalf of Joseph and
Rene Naso. Joseph Naso also testified that he intended Tolin to be part of a
buyout that was being brokered by Clyde Rhodes, see Court Transcript at
55:25 and 56:1-2, and knew that Frank Fu was relying on Tolin being part of
the buyout. (See Court Transcript at pp. 55:4-9, 53, 52, 52:10-16 and R. at p.
74-75, 66, 51:7-8, 52:8-9.) And, as part of that buyout, Frank Fu paid the sum
of $105,000.00 to Clyde Rhodes, via his dba L2O Homes, LLC and PGI
Management, Inc., and Frank Fu was supposed to receive an interest in both
Brandonwood and Tolin. See R. at pp 51-52, 77, and 84. Because Clyde
Rhodes, Joseph Naso and Rene Evans refused to acknowledge Frank Fu’s
interest in Tolin he filed a notice of interest on the same.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In this case, Joseph Naso intended to convey his interest in real property
to Frank Fu through his agent Clyde Rhodes. His agent Clyde Rhodes signed
a document conveying that interest and Frank Fu paid $105,000.00 for the
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interest. The only missing piece in the case is a document Joseph Naso signed
giving his agent authority to convey his interest in the property. However this
missing piece should be deemed satisfied since Joseph Naso testified under
oath that Clyde Rhodes is his agent, he intended to convey his interest in Tolin
to Frank Fu and new that Frank Fu was relying on Tolin being part of the deal.
The facts of this case satisfy the doctrine of substantial performance and
should also be deemed to have complied with the statute of frauds.

ARGUMENT

The trial court’s decision that Frank Fu’s notice of interest on Tolin is a
wrongful lien is not correct. The actions by the parties in this case satisfy the
doctrine of “sufficient partial performance” or the requisite statute of frauds
and therefore Frank Fu obtained an interest in Tolin. The trial court did not
consider the doctrine of sufficient partial performance and should have. And,
under the principles of general agency law the statute of frauds should also be
deemed to be met. Additionally, the trial court’s dismissal of Frank Fu’s

9

counter-claims and third-party claims is in error, as such claims are
specifically allowed pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 13(b) even in a wrongful lien
action.

I.

JOSEPH NASO’S INTEREST IN TOLIN WAS
TRANSFERRED TO FRANK FU UNDER
THE
DOCTRINE
OF
“SUFFICIENT
PARTIAL PERFORMANCE.”

In Utah an interest in real property may be transferred orally outside the
statute of frauds under the equitable doctrine of “sufficient partial
performance.” The Utah Supreme Court set forth the elements for Sufficient
Partial Performance in Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742, 751 (Utah 2002), as
follows:
[1] the oral contract must be clear and definite; [2]
the acts done in performance of the contract must
be equally clear and definite; and [3] the act must
be in reliance on the contract. Such acts in
reliance must be such that they would not have
been performed had the contract not existed, and
(b) the failure to perform on the part of the
promisor would result in fraud on the performer
who relied since damages would be inadequate.
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The word “oral” also includes acts. Id.
This case meets every required element for Sufficient Partial
Performance set forth in Warr and the trial court should have found the
transfer of property valid.

A.

The terms of the oral contract are clear.

The terms of the contract between Frank Fu and Joseph Naso are clear
and are as follows: Frank Fu was to pay the sum of $105,000.00 to Clyde
Rhodes, the actual and apparent agent1 of Joseph Naso and in exchange Frank
Fu was to receive an interest in property including Tolin. There can be no
reasonable dispute that these are the terms and information set forth below
establishes the same.
After various negotiations, Clyde Rhodes sent an email to Frank Fu on
July 18, 2007, which contained the Tolin property and stated that “Joey and
1

It cannot be reasonably disputed that Clyde Rhodes is the agent of Joseph
Naso in this transaction. Joseph Naso admitted that Clyde Rhodes had
authority to offer Tolin in the package deal and intended that it be offered.
See Court Transcript at pp. 50-53 and R. at pp. 66, 74-75. And Joseph Naso
testified that “I knew he was acting for us . . . .” See Court Transcript at pp.
55:25 and 56:1-4.
11

Rene are committed. No turning back” and that he needed “$110,000.002
before Monday evening” because Joey Naso is going out of town. R. at p. 7475.
At the hearing it was pointed out to Mr. Naso that the email stated
“Joey and Rene are committed, no turning back,” see Court Transcript at p.
55:4, Joseph responded with “Yes, that sounds right.” See Court Transcript at
p. 55:6. And again he was asked, “so you were committed and there was no
turning back?” he responded with “Yes.” See Court Transcript at p. 55:6-9.
Frank Fu was also given a spreadsheet from Clyde Rhodes that was
captioned “FRANK FU – BUY-OUT – JOEY NASO AND RENE EVANS”
and this spreadsheet included the Tolin property. See R. at p. 66. Joseph
Naso admits that he saw this spreadsheet but would not confirm when he saw
it. See R. at p. 66.
Joseph Naso also testified at the hearing when referring to the deal “At
one point I told Clyde, sounds good, sounds okay . . . .”3 And when Joseph

2

There is no dispute that the amount was later reduced to $105,000.00 as this
is the most money the bank would loan Frank Fu at the time.
12

Naso was asked “Did you know that Tolin Street was part of a potential
buyout?” by Frank Fu he answered “I did. I knew it was part of it.” See R. at
p 51:7-8. Under additional questioning Mr. Naso was asked if he “knew that
Tolin Street was part of the buyout . . .” he responded “Yes, I did.” See R. at
p 52:8-9.
He was also asked “Did you know that Mr. Fu was relying on Tolin
Street being part of the deal?” and he answered “Yes, I knew that, Yes, I knew
that.” See Court Transcript at p. 53. And when Joseph Naso was asked “ . . .
you did intend Tolin Street – you knew Tolin Street was going to be part of
the deal?” he responded “Yes.” See Court Transcript at p. 52.) And again
when asked if he “intended it to be part of the deal?” he responded “That’s
correct.” Id.

Joseph qualifies this statement by adding that when he got the paperwork he
did not sign it claiming he got “cold feet.” See Court Transcript p. 54:22-25
and p. 55:1-4. However, there is no indication ever that this message was
conveyed to Frank Fu who actually paid the money.

3
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Additionally, it is clear that the purchase price Mr. Fu was to pay for the
interest in Tolin, and other property, was $105,000.004. See Court Transcript
at p. 52:10-16.
Based on the foregoing it is clear that Joseph Naso intended to sell his
interest in Tolin to Frank Fu, that Clyde Rhodes had authority to broker the
deal, that Joseph Naso intended it to be part of the deal, and knew full well
that Frank Fu was relying on it to be part of the deal. And finally, that the
price that was to be paid for an interest in Tolin and other property was
$105,000.00 and that the sum was to be paid to Clyde Rhodes. See Record at
p. 52:11-12.

B.

The acts done in performance are also clear and definite.
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Mr. Naso testified that of the $105,000.00 paid to Clyde Rhodes, he and
Rene were to get $60,000.00 which they would then split. See Record at p.
52:11-12.
14

The next question is what was done in performance that was also clear
and definite. All of the points set forth in section “A.” immediately above
apply, i.e. the emails, the spread-sheets, the expectations and reliance by the
parties and based on the communications, the spreadsheets, the expectations
and reliance on these and other representations, Frank Fu obtained a loan from
Washington Mutual Bank for $105,000.00. See R. at p. 72. Further, Clyde
Rhodes signed a Promissory Note for the $105,000.00, the amount Frank Fu
paid and the Note had as its security an interest in all of the assets of L2O5
which includes Tolin. See R. at pp. 72 and 84. And, Frank Fu paid the
$105,000.00 to Clyde Rhodes. While Joseph Naso testified that he never
received the $60,000.00 of the $105,000.00 that he was supposed to receive
from Clyde Rhodes, this was never contemplated to be part of the contract and
no one has ever asserted that it was; that agreement was strictly between
5

Clyde Rhodes conducted this transaction through a couple different names,
PGI Management, Inc. and L2O Homes, LLC. L2O Homes, LLC was never
created, see R. at p. 14:6-8, and therefore the check for the $105,000.00 was
paid to PGI, Inc. See R. Court Transcript at p.72. Additionally Frank Fu was
to be 50% owner in L2O Homes, LLC and is at least a partner with Clyde
Rhodes for purposes of receiving an interest in Tolin. A recent review of the
Department of Corporations reveals that PGI, Inc. may not have been formally
created either.
15

Joseph Naso and his agent Clyde Rhodes. See Court Transcript 52:8-19. The
facts remains that the price for an interest in the package of property which
included Tolin was $105,000.00 and the same was to be paid to Clyde Rhodes
aka PGI Management, Inc., and it was in fact paid. See Court Transcript p.
52:11-16 and R. at p. 66, 74-75, 77, 72.

C.

Frank Fu would not have paid the $105,000.00 if there
was no contract and the failure to perform on the part
of Joseph Naso results in fraud on Frank Fu.

The only reason that Frank Fu paid the $105,000.00 was for an interest
in real property which included Tolin and Frank Fu has never been refunded
any of the money he paid. As set forth above, Joseph Naso intended Tolin to
be part of the contract, knew it was part of the contract, and knew that Frank
Fu was relying on it being part of the contract. Unless this court deems Frank
Fu’s notice of interest is valid and the trial court’s decision is reversed, a fraud
will result on Frank Fu who relied upon the actions and inactions of Joseph
Naso and the representations and actions of his agent Clyde Rhodes.
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D.

Summary of Substantial Partial Performance.

The trial court did not consider substantial partial performance when
analyzing Frank Fu’s Notice of Interest. It relied merely on the fact that
Joseph Naso did not sign the warranty deed transferring his interest. Frank Fu
argued that the Joseph Naso should be estopped in claiming it did not transfer
his interest, see Court Transcript at p. 61, he also argued that the court would
be sanctioning a fraud, see Court Transcript at pp. 43:25 and 44:1-10, if it
failed to find his Notice of Interest was valid. All of the elements of the
elements of substantial partial performance are met and this matter should be
remanded to the trial court so that the trial court’s decision can be corrected.
II.

ALTERNATIVELY, FRANK FU’S NOTICE
OF INTEREST IS NOT A WRONGFUL LIEN
BECAUSE HE HAD AN ARGUABLE BASIS
FOR FILING THE SAME AND HIS
ARGUMENTS
ARE
SUPPORTED
BY
CREDIBLE EVIDENCE.

Alternatively, Frank Fu’s notice of interest is a lien allowed by statute
and not in violation of wrongful lien act. A lien is not wrongful if at the time
it is recorded it is expressly authorized by statute. See Utah Code Ann., § 38-
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9-1(6)(a). The Marketable Record Title Act at Utah Code Ann., § 57-9-1
states:
Any person claiming an interest in land may preserve and keep
effective such interest by filing for recording during the fortyyear period immediately rolling the effective date of the root
title of the person whose record title would otherwise be
marketable, a notice in writing, duly verified by oath, setting
forth the nature of the claim.

In this case, Frank Fu obtained an interest in Tolin under the doctrine of
substantial partial performance as argued above. Being thus qualified, Frank
Fu is permitted to file his notice of interest pursuant to the Marketable Record
Title Act which exempts it as a wrongful lien. See Utah Code Ann., 38-91(6)(a). The trial court erred when it failed to recognize Frank Fu’s interest as
a statutorily lawful claim.
Joseph Naso may argue that Frank Fu did not have an interest in Tolin
because while Rene Evans (Naso) had signed the warranty deed, Joseph Naso
did not and this exact scenario was already litigated and decided in Centennial
Inv. Co., LLC v. Nuttal, 171 P.3d 458, 462 (Utah Ct. App. 2007). If the facts
stopped there, they would be correct; however, the facts do not stop there.
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This case is different from Centennial in that equitable doctrines set forth
above give Frank Fu an interest in Tolin. Joseph Naso’s nefarious use of the
law to perpetrate the fraud should not be condoned.

III.

THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS SHOULD BE
DEEMED TO BE SATISFIED WHERE A
PARTY ADMITS UNDER OATH THAT
THEIR AGENT HAD AUTHORITY TO
CONVEY LAND AND THE AGENT SIGNED
A WRITING CONVEYING AN INTEREST IN
LAND.

Frank Fu believes that the arguments above are sufficient to prove his
notice of interest is valid and that it is not a wrongful lien. However, Frank Fu
also offers this additional argument to prove his case.
With very few exceptions, the transfer of real property is governed by
Utah Code Ann., § 25-5-1 which states in pertinent part as follows:
“[n]o estate or interest in real property . . . shall be created,
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act
or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing
subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning,
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent
thereunto authorized by writing.”
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In this case, the statute of frauds should be deemed to have been
satisfied, by “operation of law,” id., because Clyde Rhodes, acting as Joseph
Naso’s agent, offered Tolin for sale to Frank Fu, Frank Fu accepted the offer
and paid $105,000.00 for an interest in Tolin and Clyde Rhodes signed a
document transferring the interest. The only missing element is the signed
writing between Joseph Naso and Clyde Rhodes giving Clyde Rhodes the
authority to convey the interest in Tolin. However, this element should be
deemed satisfied because in this case, Joseph Naso testified that Clyde Rhodes
had the authority and this should supplant or satisfy the writing element, i.e.
Joseph Naso should be estopped from claiming that Clyde Rhodes signature is
his signature.
The problem with summary proceedings such as one conducted under
Utah Code Ann., 38-9-7(3)(b) is that the non-moving party has no time to
conduct discovery. In a case like this, discovery is crucial. Joseph Naso
admitted under oath that he intended to sell his interest in Tolin and knew that
his agent was trying to do so and there was apparent express and apparent
authority for his agent to sell Tolin. Additionally, there was a signed writing
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by the agent selling or assigning the interest to Frank Fu. See R. at pp. 74-75,
77 and 84. With discovery, Frank Fu, with an almost certainty, would have
discovered a signed writing to satisfy the statute of frauds requirement. Given
Frank Fu’s counter-claims and cross claims, see R. at pp. 18-33, the court
should have at a minimum allowed the case to proceed and should not have
decided the case under the summary proceedings so that Frank Fu could have
conducted discovery.
While the summary proceeding section provides a great protection to
shield those that have been the victim of a wrongful lien, it should not be used
as a sword to create another victim that is entitled to a lien. The summary
proceeding in this case has denied Frank Fu of his due process rights provided
for by the Utah Constitution at Art. I., § 7. In this case there is almost no
doubt if Frank Fu was allowed to conduct discovery he would have been able
to marshal evidence to support his claim.
In a case such as this case, where the weight of evidence suggests that
the non-moving party will likely prevail in the normal course of litigation, a
summary proceeding effectively denies Mr. Fu of his right to due process.
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This matter should be remanded to the trial court with the instruction
that the matter proceed under the normal course of litigation so that discovery
may be conducted.
CONCLUSION
This case should be remanded to the trial court so that it can consider
the doctrine of substantial performance or find that the statute of frauds has
been met or to allow for additional discovery to be completed.

DATED this

day of October 2008.
__________________________
Bradley G. Nykamp
Attorney for Appellant Frank Fu
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